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I. INTRODUCTION
"Local hire" laws require that when units of local government hire em-
ployees a preference be given to residents of the governmental unit.
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Detroit College of Law.
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These laws affect employees directly hired by the city or state,' as well as
employees hired by private contractors to do construction work.2 Natu-
rally, this employment preference for residents discriminates against
those who do not reside within the city or state. Nonresidents, however,
are afforded extensive protection against discrimination by states and
their political subdivisions by two clauses of the Constitution:' the com-
merce clause4 and the interestate privileges and immunities," or comity,'
clause.
In two cases recently decided by the Supreme Court, nonresidents of a
regulating state invoked these constitutional clauses to challenge local
hire laws that were enforced against private contractors employed by cit-
ies to perform construction work. The first of these cases, White v. Mas-
sachusetts Council of Construction Employees, Inc.,7 held that while lo-
cal hire laws as applied to private contractors discriminate against
nonresidents, these laws do not invoke the protection afforded by the
commerce clause.8 The White court, however, expressly reserved the
question of whether such local hire laws violate the interstate privileges
and immunities clause.9 The Court responded to this question during its
next term in United Building & Construction Trades Council v. Mayor
of Camden.10 In this case, the Court held that local hire laws as applied to
contractors employed by a city to perform construction work must satisfy
the requirements of the interstate privileges and immunities clause.'
This Article will analyze the Court's decision in Camden and cases that
preceded it. The commerce and privileges and immunities clauses will be
examined with respect to local hiring preferences, with a consideration of
the operation of the two clauses in the private sector and their impact on
the control and disposition of state property. Attention will then turn to
recent market-participant decisions. This discussion will show that a
change-of-residence local-hire law has a good chance of being upheld. Fi-
nally, this Article will attempt to explain the Court's decisions concerning
' Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Detroit, 385 Mich. 519, 190 N.W.2d 97 (1971),
appeal dismissed, 405 U.S. 950 (1972).
See infra notes 7-8.
See infra notes 4-5.
"The Congress shall have Power . . . [tjo regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
2 "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citi-
zens in the several States." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. See L. TRIaE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 404 (1978).
' Austin v. New Hampshire 420 U.S. 656, 660 (1975). See J. NowAX, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 300 (2d ed. 1983).
460 U.S. 204 (1983).
Id. at 204 n.3.
' Id. at 204 n.12.
10 - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 1020 (1984), revg, 88 N.J. 317, 443 A.2d 148 (1982).
" Id. at __, 104 S. Ct. at 1023.
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the state market-participant doctrine.
II. Camden: BACKGROUND AND DECISION
In an attempt to combat discrimination against minorities, New Jersey
enacted a state-wide law that required affirmative action in employment
for construction work done for state and local governments. 12 The law
was administered by the state department of the treasury 3 and was im-
plemented by individual municipalities. State approval was required for
city ordinances that prescribed an affirmative action plan for city con-
struction projects.1 4 The city of Camden, New Jersey enacted such an or-
dinance which was then approved by the state.", The ordinance required
that private contractors who performed work for the city give a prefer-
ence to minority workers." The ordinance further mandated that twenty-
five percent of the city's construction work be awarded to minority work-
ers, and that residents of the city of Camden receive a hiring preference
for forty percent of the construction jobs."
These employment preferences were established as goals rather than
rigid quotas,'" and "minority workers" were defined as Blacks, Hispanics,
Asians, American Indians and women.19 The composition of population of
the city of Camden was thirty percent Caucasian,2" with minorities in-
cluding women comprising up to seventy-five percent of the population.2 1
Blacks comprised fifty-three percent of the city's population,22 but consi-
tuted barely over fourteen percent of the population of Camden County.2"
According to statistics of the United States Department of Labor for
1977, the unemployment rate was eleven and one-half percent for the
city, eight and one-tenth percent for the state, and seven and six-tenths
percent for the county.24 The city unemployment rate was eighteen and
four-tenths percent for Blacks and fifteen and six-tenths percent for His-
panics.2  These figures served as the basis for the employment
preferences.
" Id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1023 n.2.
,3 Id.
" d.
" Id. at __,104 S. Ct. at 1024.
88 N.J. at 320, 443 A.2d at 149.
" U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1024.
" 88 N.J. at , 443 A.2d at 155-56. Initially, however the preference for residents took
in the form of a quota. __ U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1025; 88 N.J. at 337-38, 443 A.2d at 158.
" 88 N.J. at 320 n.1, 443 A.2d. at 149 n.1.
21 Id. at 327 n.5, 443 A.2d at 153 n.5. The city's total population in 1980 was 84,910 of
which 25,739 were Caucasian.
2 Id. at 328, 443 A.2d at 153.
22 Id.
23 Id.
21 Id. at 324, 443 A.2d at 151.
25 Id.
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Construction contractors did not challenge Camden's ordinance,"6
rather, an association of labor unions did. 7 The labor unions challenged
Camden's affirmative action program as a denial to whites of the equal
protection of the laws guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.28 The
primary basis for this claim was the fact that the hiring preferences man-
dated rigid quotas rather than goals for minority workers.2 9 In addition,
the unions claimed that the program had to be supported by state admin-
istrative"0 or legislative findings of discrimination. 1 The New Jersey Su-
preme Court disagreed32 emphasizing that federal legislative, 3 executive"
and judicial findings of pervasive discrimination 35 in the construction in-
dustry were widespread. 6 Before the Supreme Court, the unions relin-
quished this direct assault upon Camden's affirmative action plan and, 37
ultimately, relied exclusively upon the interstate privileges and immuni-
ties clause.3 8 The New Jersey Supreme Court, upholding Camden's ordi-
nance and affirmative action plan, had ruled that this clause did not pro-
tect nonresidents of the regulating state from discriminatory
classifications upon residence in a city rather than residence in a state.3
The Supreme Court, however, disagreed,40 reversed judgment for the city
of Camden, and remanded the case for the construction of a factual rec-
ord to determine whether the local-hire ordinance violated the interstate
privileges and immunities clause. 1 The Court observed that while the as-
sociation of labor unions had at least some members who did not reside in
New Jersey,4 2 the ordinance struck a balance of employment opportuni-
ties primarily between citizens of New Jersey, namely the inhabitants of
the city of Camden, and its suburbs in New Jersey.
The demographics of Camden are similar to those of metropolitan areas
throughout the nation. The typical example is the relatively poor, per-
haps deteriorating, central city that is doing its utmost to save and im-
prove what jobs and tax base it has. The central city is populated, in large
2 Id. at 335, 443 A.2d at 157.
27 - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. at 1024.
" 88 N.J. at 331, 443 A.2d. at 155 n.7.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 330, 443 A.2d at 154.
31 Id. at 333, 443 A.2d at 156.
2 Id.
" Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 447-78 (1980).
" See Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 301-02 n.40 (1978).
32 United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 198 n.1 (1979).
36 88 N.J. 317, 331-36, 443 A.2d. 148, 155-57 (1982).
3 - U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1024 n.5.
38 Id. at .. ,104 S. Ct. at 1025.
a Id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1026.
Id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1023.
41 Id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1023, 1029-30.
02 Id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1024 n.4.
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part, by racial and other deprived minorities, and it is surrounded by sub-
urbs that are affluent by comparison.
The majority of the jobs affected by the ordinance could have been
held by commuters into Camden. Nevertheless, the Court said that the
local hire ordinance must satisfy the strict"0 demands of the interstate
privileges and immunities clause." A crucial factor in the ultimate deci-
sion may be that Camden's local-hire program involves the spending of
the city's own funds.4" Similarly, the city's grave social and economic ills
may also be assigned great weight .4 The ability to predict the final out-
come, however, seems doubtful at best.
4 7
A local-hire law requiring that city employees live within the city would
appear to be constitutional." Generally, such an ordinance would offer
equal employment opportunities to all nonresidents of the city. Further,
preservation of the city's tax base would serve to distinguish the law from
those laws condemned by the commerce and interstate privileges and im-
munities clause as economic protectionism. Camden's local hire law, on
the other hand, is a wall of protectionism that insulates the city's resi-
dents against competition from outsiders in the area of city construction
jobs. Despite the fact that these two constitutional clauses are generally
hostile toward state economic protectionism, until the decision in Cam-
den, there was no reason to believe that such a local-hire law would not
be valid. In fact, a previous case, Hein v. McCall,"' had found that local-
hire laws for public contractors did not violate the interstate privileges
and immunities clause."0 Camden changed both this result and the stan-
dard used to construe this clause."
III. THE OPERATION OF THE COMMERCE AND INTERSTATE PRIVILEGES AND
IMMUNITIES CLAUSES
The commerce clause and the interstate privileges and immunities
clause provide overlapping, but not identical, protection to nonresidents
of a state from state discrimination.s The privileges and immunities
" Id. at __, 104 S. Ct. at 1029. See infra text accompanying notes 111-122.
"' Id. at __, 104 S. Ct. at 1023.
"' Id. at -' 104 S. Ct. at 1029.
48 Id. at 104 S. Ct. at 1030.
"7 Cf. White v. Massachusetts Council of Const. Employers, Inc. 460 U.S. 204 (1983)
(Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting). See infra text accompanying notes 155-69.
" See infra text accompanying note 209-220.
"8 239 U.S. 175 (1915).
50 See infra text accompanying notes 147-50.
"' See infra text accompanying notes 52-66.
" Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 532-35 (1978); Baldwin v. Montana Fish and Game
Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 379-80 (1978). See TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 404
(1978).
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clause, for example, does not protect corporations," while the commerce
clause does;5  the former does not protect conduct that occurs outside the
regulating state,55 while the later does. 56 Further, prior to Camden the
standard of protection of the privileges and immunities clause appeared
to be much less restrictive than that of the commerce clause. Before Cam-
den, the recognized measure of protection due nonresidents of a state
under the privileges and immunities clause was the same as that the state
gave to its own residents. 7 A state was, therefore, permitted to discrimi-
nate against nonresidents to the same extent that it discriminated against
its own citizens. This standard essentially would permit a state to favor
residents of a city at the expense of both its own residents and those of
other states. In his dissenting opinion in Camden, Justice Blackmun ob-
served that the hiring preference for residents of the city of Camden sat-
isfied the interstate privileges and immunities clause based upon these
grounds.5
Nevertheless, it is not difficult to comprehend why this original stan-
dard of protection might prove less than adequate when measured against
standards that reject state discrimination against citizens of other states.
This standard allows a regulating state to wall off territorial enclaves for
the exclusive benefit of its citizens; overall, it allows a regulating state to
improve the position of its citizens by allocating to them more of the
state's opportunities. Thus, a hiring preference for a city's residents could
permit them to have all of the jobs affected by the preference. Naturally,
nonresidents of the state would be excluded. As a result, the residents of
the regulating state would have more job opportunities after the enact-
ment of the preference than before.
The Camden Court found that these results and the standard that per-
mitted them were unacceptable. Rejecting the less restrictive standard of
the privileges and immunities clause, the Court endorsed a more restric-
tive standard of protection prescribed by the commerce clause, an exam-
ple of which may be found in Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison."9 In
Dean Milk, a dairy farmer in northern Illinois wanted to sell his pas-
turized milk." Madison, however, forbade the sale of such milk unless it
Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869).
Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47, 57, 59 (1891); Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union
Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1878).
Cf. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395-96 (1948).
Cf. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE UNITED STATES 41-43 (1953). For
an example of the interstate motive of the commerce clause, see Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978).
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 77 (1873).
- U.S. -. , 104 S. Ct. 1020, 1033-34 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
a 340 U.S. 351 (1951).
I' d. at 351. When the case arose, there were 5600 dairy farms in Dane County, of which
Madison is the county seat, and they produced 600,000 pounds of raw milk annually which
was more than 10 times the requirements of Madison. Id. at 351-52.
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was pasteurized in a local dairy. 1 The Court held that the application of
this regulation to milk from out-of-state farms violated the commerce
clause. The state's health interest in pure milk did not justify a trade
preference for a few local dairies when the reasonable alternative means
of inspecting dairies outside Wisconsin would permit safe milk for
Madison consumers.
6 2
Dean Milk clearly illustrates that the commerce clause prohibits a local
market from discriminating against residents of other states unless there
is substantial justification for the differential treatment. Camden
adopted this commerce clause standard of protection under the auspices
of the interestate privileges and immunities clause. Thus, territorial en-
claves of preferential treatment aimed at nonresidents of a regulating
state must be justified where the nonresidents may suffer an adverse
change of position. It is immaterial that the regulation also discriminates
against many of the regulating state's own citizens.63
A year before the Camden decision, the Court in White v. Massachu-
setts Council of Construction Employers, Inc.6 4 held that the commerce
clause does not apply to local hiring preferences for government construc-
tion work. Both White and Camden demonstrate that the commerce
clause fails to protect nonresidents from discrimination when the state
acts as a proprietor or market participant; 5 the state acts as a proprietor
when it imposes local-hire restrictions on private contractors.6 Through
state proprietorship, unprincipled discrimination against nonresidents of
a regulating state is permitted." Thus, the commerce clause not only fails
to protect nonresidents from state discrimination in construction employ-
ment but it in fact permits discrimination in all forms of state
employment.
The protection not provided by the commerce clause, however, is pro-
vided to some extent by the immunities clause. Thus, Camden protects
nonresidents from state discrimination when they seek jobs with state-
employed private contractors. Explaining why one clause provides non-
residents with protection not allowed by the other, the Court stated:
The Commerce Clause acts as an implied restraint upon state
regulatory powers. Such powers must give way before the superior
authority of Congress to legislate on (or leave unregulated) mat-
ters involving interstate commerce. When the state acts solely as
I d. at 350, 352.
62 Id. at 354-55.
SU.S at __ 104 S. Ct. at 1027.
- U.S. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 1042, 1046 (1983).
65 Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 438-39 (1980); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426
U.S. 794, 808 (1976).
" Camden, - U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1025; White,__ U.S. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 1046;
Reeves, 447 U.S. at 438-39; Hughes, 426 U.S. at 794.
" - U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1027.
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a market participant, no conflict between state regulation and
federal authority can arise .... The Privileges and Immunities
Clause, on the other hand, imposes a direct restraint on state ac-
tion in the interests of interstate harmony. . . . This concern
with comity cuts across the regulator-market participant distinc-
tion that is crucial under the Commerce Clause. It is discrimina-
tion against out-of-state residents on matters of fundamental con-
cern which triggers the Clause, not regulation affecting interstate
commerce. Thus, the fact that Camden is merely setting condi-
tions on its expenditures for goods and services in the market-
place does not preclude the possibility that those conditions vio-
late the Privileges and Immunities Clause."8
This explanation, however, is deficient in that it fails to address the
paradox that identical forms of discrimination can be deemed hostile to
interstate harmony under the privileges and immunities clause, yet may
not hostile to interstate harmony under the commerce clause. The first
three sentences of the Court's explanation do suggest that the inhibitions
of the commerce clause apply only to a state's regulatory power and per-
haps to some other coercive state power, not state action as a market
participant or proprietor. It is possible that the Framers of the Constitu-
tion only were concerned with state taxation and regulation-including
taxes and regulations hostile to other states-when they drafted the com-
merce clause.68 If so, this would support the conclusion that certain types
of state action, including the state acting as a proprietor, are not subject
to the negative implications of the commerce clause. This assumed fact
would, however, also support the conclusion that these different types of
state action, including state proprietorship, are not subject to the inter-
state privileges and immunities clause.
The Articles of Confederation is the common source of both clauses."
The two clauses have a "mutally reinforcing relationship"'71 and the Court
has said that both rely on the same reasoning when the state acting dis-
criminates against nonresidents.7 1 Therefore, if the Framers of the Con-
stitution were not concerned with such discrimination when they drafted
the commerce clause, they must not have been concerned with it when
they proposed the interestate privileges and immunities clause.
The Supreme Court reports are replete with commerce clause prece-
dents that protect nonresidents from state discrimination that is hostile
to national unity. 73 In 1821, Chief Justice John Marshall said: "In all
-- U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1028-29.
69 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976); see L. TRIBE, supra note 52, at 336.
70 Hicklin, 437 U.S. at 531-32 n.16; Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 379-80.
7 Hicklin, 437 U.S. at 531.
72 Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 333 (1979).
71 See infra text accompanying notes 98-110.
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commercial regulations, we are one and the same people." '74 From the per-
spective of state discrimination against nonresidents, it is inconceivable
that particular commercial activity can be essential to interstate harmony
under the interstate privileges and immunities clause without also being
essential to interestate harmony under the commerce clause. As a result
of Camden, however, the inconceivable now exists.
Congress, of course, can enact legislation freeing the states from com-
merce clause restrictions.: Its power to free the states from the restric-
tions of the interstate privileges and immunities clause, however, is an-
other issue."' Whatever this difference may be, it cannot trivialize the
essentials of interstate harmony when they implicate one clause of the
Constitution rather than another, especially when both clauses were in-
tended to secure interstate harmony.
In summary, the Supreme Court has made two findings. First, it has
subjected local-hire laws for the employees of public contractors to the
fairly rigorous demands of the interstate privileges and immunities
clause. Second, the Court has recognized a state-proprietary or market-
participant doctrine that permits the states to have an enclave of unprin-
cipled discrimination that is not subject to the usual protective rules of
the commerce clause. However, as the local-hire cases show, this "en-
clave" does not operate under the interstate privileges and immunities
clause, although both clauses were meant to provide comparable and mu-
tual protection. 7 In fact, travelling parallel paths, they have consistently
provided such protection.7"
Moreover, the parallel operation of these two clauses has extended to
state discrimination against nonresidents in the disposition of state prop-
erty. 79 Initially, these clauses did not provide protection to nonresidents
from this kind of discrimination because both clauses had a state-proprie-
torship doctrine that permitted the same type of discrimination that is
now allowed by the state-market-participant doctrine. " Eventually, how-
ever, both of these clauses came to provide nonresidents with protection
from state discrimation in the disposition of state property.8 ' Then, as
the local-hire cases disclose, these two clauses experienced a partial
divergince from their parallel paths due to the contradictory operation of
71 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (16 Wheat) 264, 413-14 (1821).
" See Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 652-
53 (1981)(Congress authorized state retaliatory tax upon foreign insurance companies when
their home states taxed the taxing state's insurance companies at a higher rate than that
approved by the taxing state.).
7 460 U.S. at 215 n.1. (1983)(Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting); see, L. TRIBE,
supra note 52, at 403 n.18.
77 Hicklin, 437 U.S. at 531; Hughes, 441 U.S. at 334.
78 See in/ra text accompanying notes 89-94.
"9 See infra text accompanying notes 125-134.
"o See infra text accompanying notes 125-126, 135-39.
"' See infra text accompanying notes 140-161.
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the state-market-participant doctrine.2
It would be possible, of course, to discuss the validity of local hire laws
under the interstate privileges and immunities clause by ignoring the
commerce clause and the market-participant contradiction that it con-
tains. However because of the parallel development that both clauses
have had, it is not possible to discuss local hire and the interestate privi-
leges and immunities clause without drawing upon commerce clause prin-
ciples . Further, consideration of local-hire laws and the interstate privi-
leges and immunities clause requires a discussion of the appropriate use
of the state's property power. This involves a state's subsidy power, as
well as its power to tie a residence requirement to employment in the
state, especially employment that is financed by the state. This discussion
of a state's property power will show that the Supreme Court could have
reached the same results in the recent state-market-participant cases
without using the market-participant doctrine.8 3
IV. THE OPERATION OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND INTERSTATE
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR
The commerce clause and interstate privileges and immunities clause
can both require a state that wants to provide more private sector bene-
fits to its citizens than the private sector allows to satisfy competely the
economic claims of all nonresidents first.8 4 Whatever remains, if anything,
can then be enjoyed by the residents of the regulating state.
Baldwin v. Seelig,s5 the leading case, arose out of the Great Depres-
sion. 8 The free market gave New York's dairy farmers a price for their
milk that fell far short of production costs.8 7 In an effort to save a basic
industry from what might have been total destruction, 8 New York legis-
lated a higher price, one that would provide viability for farmers with
customers who could afford to pay. 8 As a result of this higher price, there
was a disparity between the price of milk in New York and its neighbor,
Vermont.8 0 New York was then confronted with the possibility that its
residents would purchase Vermont's low-priced milk before they bought
the more expensive New York product. New York responded with a law
requiring a New Yorker who purchased milk in Vermont to pay the Ver-
mont dairy farmer the high New York price if the purchaser intended to
'" See supra text accompanying notes 66-69.
s See infra text accompanying notes 174-189.
- U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. 1024 n.4.
294 U.S. 511 (1935).
8' 294 U.S. at 519 (Court's reference to Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934)).
291 U.S. at 515.
88 Id. at 539.
Id. at 518 n.2 (paragraph 6).
90 294 U.S. 511.
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bring the milk back to New York.91
The Supreme Court unanimously invalidated New York's interstate
price-control law, 92 leaving New York with the choice of giving up its in-
terstate price control or watching while New Yorkers bought Vermont
milk before buying more expensive milk from New York's dairy farmers.
The court held that the commerce clause prohibits a state from protect-
ing a local economic interest against out-of-state competition."3 It was im-
material that unequal economic competition and the depression
threatened one of a state's basic industries. In such circumstances, the
Court found that one state cannot save itself at the expense of another
state. Rather, the states must "sink or swim" together.9
Baldwin applies to a discriminatory trade preference for a state's prod-
ucts in its markets. The same rule also applies to a discriminatory trade
preference for the labor of the regulating state's residents in its labor
market. Edwards v. California,"9 another depression-era case,9 held that
an economic crisis did not permit a state to keep out indigent unem-
ployed nonresidents looking for work. 97 The Court held that welfare costs
do not justify a state bar of interstate migration;98 the commerce clause
forbids it. 99
Other cases also demonstrate that the commerce clause prevents a state
from denying nonresidents equal access to private-sector opportunities
within the state. As in Baldwin,'0 ° the clause assures citizens of other
states their fair market share whenever a state tries to hoard private op-
portunities or resources for that state's own citizens. This protective rule
has invalidated preferential access for a state's residents to milk,101
fuel,'9 2 and even waste disposal service.' The Supreme Court has said
that the commerce clause creates a domestic common market free from
state discriminatory trade preferences favoring local economic inter-
ests.104 In fact, the clause has performed its task so effectively that it has
left little parallel supplementary work for the interestate privileges and
immunities clause in the private sector. The latter clause nevertheless
"' Id. at 520.
"' Id. at 527.
93 Id.
" Id. at 523.
- 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
" Id. at 173.
-' Id. at 173-74.
- Id. at 174-75.
-' Id. at 177.
100 294 U.S. 511.
... H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
... Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1910).
... City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
"' Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 803 (1976); H.P. Hood & Sons, 336
U.S. at 538-39.
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precluded Alaska from awarding Alaskans a preference to all private sec-
tor work generated by the development of Alaska's enormous oil wealth,
including construction of the Alaska pipeline."'
The commerce clause and interestate privileges and immunities clause,
however, do not completely disable a state from discriminating against
nonresidents; a state may do so when discrimination is necessary to ac-
complish some governmental objective other than the award of a trade
preference to its citizens. A state can award its citizens what is in effect a
trade preference when it is necessary to further other state interests.
Thus, for example, the prevention of disease allows a state compel farm-
ers to burn dead farm animals or sell them to local fertilizer plants al-
though plants in other states were willing to buy the carcases.'10 A state
may also prohibit interstate disposition of its scarce privately-owned
ground water if such action is in the interests of health, rather than eco-
nomic protectionism.'10 Earlier, a similar restriction preventing diversion
of a state's streams while allowing ordinary riparian use helped to pre-
serve their navigability although it denied consumers in New York City
access to New Jersey waters.0 8 States have also been successful in pro-
tecting their butter industries against competition from oleomargaine
made in other states in the interest of preventing consumer confusion and
deception respecting similar products.'0 9 Similarly, environmental objec-
tives related to waste disposal allowed Minnesota to ban temporarily the
use of throw-away plastic milk pouches, although the ban favored the
state's paper products industry.11 Dean Milk, as stated earlier, indicated
that a state could require local pasteurization of out-of-state milk if there
were no other means to obtain pure milk for consumers."'
Although the Court has said that facial discrimination against inter-
state commerce "invokes the strict scrutiny of any purported legitimate
local purpose and of the absence of any nondiscriminatory alterna-
tives," '1 the precedents do not require application of the strict scrutiny
test,1 3 which is usually a fatally-invalidating test,"4 when a state has to
discriminate against nonresidents to protect some local interest other
than a trade preference."' Rather, it seems that careful judicial review,
103 Hicklin, 437 U.S. at 518.
106 Clason v. Indiana, 306 U.S. 439 (1939).
l07 Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
10 Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1908).
1 9 Cf. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 151 (1938); Plumley v. Massa-
chusetts, 155 U.S. 461 (1894); Powell v. Pennsylvania, 270 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1888).
11 Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 457 (1981).
I. 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951).
Hughes, 441 U.S. at 337.
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 636 (1969).
... See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 319 (1976)(Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
"I Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353-54 (1977).
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akin to that demanded by the equal protection clause, of some classifica-
tions that are subjected to the so-called "intermediate test" of equal pro-
tection is all that is required." 6 The applicable standard, taken from
Toomer v. Witsell '" 7 and approved in Camden,'18 permits discrimination
against nonresidents when there are substantial reasons for it and when
the discrimination bears a close relation to these reasons.1 9
In summary, state discrimination against out-of-state interests to pro-
tect local interests is not favored. The commerce and interstate privileges
and immunities clauses do not allow state trade preferences for local self-
ishness and self-aggrandizement. As a rule, the clauses condemn these
preferences. This rule, however, has been ironclad only in the private sec-
tor. The rules respecting preferential access for a state's citizens to the
benefits of resources and enterprise owned by the state, although hardly
uniform, have been permissive, lenient and indulgent.
V. STATE PROPERTY DISPOSITIONS: COMMERCE CLAUSE AND INTERSTATE
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE
The restrictions of these two clauses upon the disposition of state prop-
erty disclose a parallel development. Initially, dispositions of state prop-
erty were not subject to either clause. Later, state property dispositions
became subject to both clauses. Then, a new state -market-participant
doctrine freed state property dispositions from the commerce clause, but
not from the interstate privileges and immunities clause.
A. The Commerce Clause
In Geer v. Connecticut,2 ' the Court held that the commerce clause did
not invalidate a state law that forbade the taking of game birds killed
within the state to other states, although intrastate use and consumption
of the birds was permitted. Reaching this conclusion, the Court observed:
"The wild game within a state belong to the people in their collective
sovereign capacity. It is not the subject of private ownership, except in so
far as the people may elect to make it so." ''
Subsequently, the Court curtailed the reach of this statement by hold-
ing that the commerce clause applies when the state licenses private en-
terprise to catch its free swimming shrimp and market them in interstate
commerce. In Foster Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel,122 Louisiana re-
"0 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)(gender classification must serve important
government objectives and be substantially related to the achievement of these objectives).
.1 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
- U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1029.
334 U.S. at 396.
161 U.S. 519 (1896).
,I' Id. at 529.
12 278 U.S. 1 (1928).
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quired its shrimp to be shelled and hulled at private local canneries
before being removed from the state. The Court held that the require-
ment was invalid under the commerce clause because it was a trade pref-
erence that impermissibly discriminated against canneries in other
states." 3 State ownership of the shrimp was not decisive because the
state permitted the shrimp to be marketed in interstate commerce rather
than reserved for local use and consumption, as Geer would have
allowed.' 4
Ultimately, the state lost the status of property owner of wild fish and
game in its territory. The state's ownership claim was deemed to be a
fiction"' and "pure fantasy.""" Similarly, in Hughes v. Oklahoma"7 the
court declared that no one can own wild fish and game without reducing
them to possession." 8 Hughes overruled Geer and held that the com-
merce clause struck down a state's discriminatory prohibition of the in-
terstate sale of natural minnows from its waters." '
The absence of state property rights in fish and game deprives the state
of any basis for discriminating against nonresidents as a property owner
when the state regulates the acquisition of fish and game. The declassifi-
cation of wild game and fish as state property, therefore, increases the
protection afforded to nonresidents from state discrimination. However,
the Court also said, before the recent state-market-participant cases took
discernible shape, that state ownership of property would not justify un-
principled discrimination against nonresidents under wither the com-
merce clause or the interstate privileges and immunities clause. 30 Thus
during this time, the precedents concerning the restrictions of the inter-
state privileges and immunities clause matched those concerning the com-
merce clause.
B. The Interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause
The early case of McCready v. Virginia' held that a state could let its
citizens exploit the state's oyster beds while automatically excluding non-
residents from them altogether without violating the interstate privileges
and immunities clause."' Subsequently, however, in Toomer v. Witsell'"
the Court ruled that the clause forbade a state from denying nonresident
'3 Id. at 13.
"2 Id. at 11-13.
"' Toomer, 334 U.S. at 402.
216 Douglas v. Seacoast Prod., Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 284 (1977).
"2 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
"' Id. at 335.
'2 Id. at 338.
Hicklin, 437 U.S. at 528-29, 531-34.
94 U.S. 391 (1877).
... Id. at 396.
334 U.S. 385 (1948).
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commercial fishermen access to its shrimp in the marginal sea. Eventu-
ally, in Hicklin v. Orbeck"3 ' the Court found that the interestate privi-
leges and immunities clause does provide some protection from arbitrary
state discrimination against nonresidents when the state develops prop-
erty to which it has title. 3 5
In Hicklin, Alaska awarded an employment preference to its citizens in
all employment generated by the exploitation of oil resources owned by
the state. The Court struck down the preference because it impermissibly
intruded upon private sector employment having only a tenuous relation-
ship to the development of Alaska's property. 36 The Court went further
when it discussed McCready'37 which involved a state's exploitation of its
oyster beds and said that the development of state property was not an
enclave of permissible arbitrary state discrimination against nonresi-
dents. 38 Rather, the Court found that discrimination against nonresi-
dents in the disposition of state property had to be justified;'3 9 this was
true even of property that the state owned without qualification.
C. Both Clauses
This pronouncement was adequate to resolve a case requiring only a
construction of the interstate privileges and immunities clause; however,
the court further explained why this reasoning also applied to the com-
merce clause although none of the parties to the case invoked this latter
clause. 40 The Court underscored its explanation by emphasizing its deci-
sion in Foster Foundation Packing Co. v. Haydel'4' in which the state
had licensed private enterprises to catch and market its shrimp in inter-
state commerce.' 42 The commerce clause applied to this disposition of
state property although the disposition itself was clearly nonregulatory
and the act of a state market-participant in any ordinary sense of those
words.
Not yet content, the Court proceeded to clarify Heim v. McCall,"3 a
comparatively old case that had been justifiably understood as holding
that the interstate privileges and immunities clause permits a state to
stipulate with public contractors who do the state's construction work for
a discriminatory hiring preference for the state's citizens. This proposi-
- 437 U.S. 518 (1978).
"' Id. at 528-29.
"' Id. at 529.
131 94 U.S. 391 (1877).
"' 437 U.S. at 528.
Id. at 529.
,,O Id. at 532-34.
141 278 U.S. 1 (1928).
112 437 U.S. at 533.
143 239 U.S. 175 (1915).
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tion, in fact, appeared at the forefront of the Court's opinion, " " and the
law challenged in Heim provided for such a discriminatory hiring prefer-
ence.'4 Heim, however, explicitly held only that the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment and certain treaties did not prohibit
a state from denying aliens employment in construction work done for
the state.'4 The Hicklin Court emphasized only this explicit ruling and
thereby deprived Heim of any status as an authority allowing state dis-
crimination against citizens of other states in awarding public construc-
tion contracts. 4 7 Hicklin's reinterpretation of Heim was approved by a
unanimous Court. Combined with the discourse about state property dis-
positions and the commerce clause, the Court clearly made public con-
struction contracts with discriminatory hiring preferences subject to the
restrictions of commerce clause.
Naturally, this was exactly the opposite course from that needed to
prepare the commerce clause for the reception of a new arbitrary state-
market-participant doctrine. At the time, the new doctrine was just a
seed, a single case that had been decided two years earlier concerning the
use of discriminatory state bounty payments to ameliorate the eyesore of
junked automobiles. 4" The rapid growth of this "seed" will be discussed
later. 19
VI. LOCAL HIRE AND UNEMPLOYMENT RELIEF
In Hicklin,'5 ° Alaska argued that it acted to relieve state unemploy-
ment when it mandated an employment preference for its residents in all
work related to the exploitation of its oil wealth, including construction of
the Alaska pipeline.' This discriminatory job preference was held inva-
lid because it intruded too far into the private job sector where blatant
state trade preferences harmful to nonresidents are not tolerated.'52 The
Court also discussed the power of the state to award a discriminatory job
preference to its citizens to alleviate unemployment; the validity of a dis-
criminatory allocation of private sector jobs to unemployed state resi-
dents was said to be questionable.'' Private sector job discrimination to
support a job training program, however, elicited a more sympathetic re-
sponse,' but one that was hardly free from doubt.'5 5 Further, the Court
114 Id. at 176.
,41 Id. at 176-77.
Id. at 193-94.
'17 437 U.S. at 531, n.15.
148 Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 810.
'4 See infra text accompanying notes 157-209.
,6o 437 U.S. at 518.
Id. at 520-21.
Id. at 528-29.
Id. at 526.
114 Id. at 526-28.
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left open the possibility that a state might have a larger power to help its
unemployed by discriminating against nonresidents in managing and dis-
posing of its own property. 6'
Arguably, carefully limited job discrimination against nonresidents
ought to be permissible if its purpose is to provide viability in the labor
market to persons without marketable job skills. All states are confronted
with this problem, and its solution seems to call for some government
assistance. The alternative might leave a large underclass in a condition
of perpetual helplessness. Once economic viability was attained, however,
it seems that the group could accept the same unemployment risks that
others have.
The precedents, however, seem to preclude state job discrimination
against nonresidents in the private sector. For example, Edwards v. Cali-
fornia,'157 cited in Hicklin,"'s barred California from preventing nonresi-
dent indigents from looking for work in the state during the depression, a
restriction that would have provided at least short term benefits to unem-
ployed Californians.'59 Similarly, during the depression, New York was
not permitted to save its dairy industry from destruction if rescue meant
denying Vermont milk access to the New York market. 60 During an eco-
nomic emergency, one state cannot save itself at the expense of a fellow
states; all states must sink or swim together."'
This conception of national unity arguably should control the result
when the state wants to help its own unemployed through job discrimina-
tion against nonresidents in the operation of the state or state-assisted
enterprises, provided that the enterprise is not of the "make work" kind.
"Make work" projects for the unemployed are different in kind from eco-
nomically available enterprises. Like public welfare payments, a state
does as much as it can when it provides for its own people. Necessary
work, however, whether it is private or state enterprise, seemingly ought
to be available to all Americans, regardless of their state citizenship. Ar-
bitrary job discrimination against nonresidents merely because the state
owns or assists an enterprise is difficult to defend and may well be
unconstitutional.
As a result, there is a good chance that a local-hire ordinance for public
construction work will be unconstitutional if it absolutely forecloses non-
residents of the state from participation in the work. On the other hand,
a municipal ordinance that offers employment to nonresidents of the
state who are willing to move to the municipality should have a better
M Id. at 528.
16 Id. at 528-29.
157 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
358 437 U.S. at 526 n.9.
314 U.S. at 173-74.
Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 522-23.
'6' Id.; cf. Hicklin, 437 U.S. at 534.
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chance of being upheld. The validity of such an ordinance would depend
upon the appropriate use of a state's power of property and subsidy to
attract and hold industry and jobs, and these matters, in turn, implicate
the recent state-market-participant doctrine.
VII. THE NEW STATE-MARKET-PARTICIPANT DOCTRINE
A. The Interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Commerce
Clause and a State's Employees
During the same term that marked the appearance of the recent state-
market-participant doctrine,'6 2 the Supreme Court held, in effect al-
though not expressly, that the protection of the interstate privileges and
immunities and commerce clauses is not available to nonresidents when
the state itself makes hiring decisions. The Court made this ruling with-
out referring to the state-market-participant doctrine or either constitu-
tional clause in McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service Commission,"6 3
which held that a city's discharge of a policeman who insisted upon living
in another state while working for the city did not violate the right of a
person to travel from state to state. The court simply stated: "There is no
support in our cases for such a claim.'
'1
1
4
Since the policeman in McCarthy moved to New Jersey and became
one of its residents at the instant he lost his job, he could have argued
that the interstate privileges and immunities clause forbade Philadelphia
from discriminating against him. Further, his interstate-commuter status
would have supported the same claim under the commerce clause. He did
not invoke either clause, however. The Court tersely observed that the
precedents did not question "the validity of a condition placed upon mu-
nicipal employment that a person be a resident at the time time of his
application." ' 65
Since a state attracts its employees from the labor market, the state-
market-participant doctrine would have withdrawn the protection of the
commerce clause from the policeman in McCarthy has the Court chosen
to apply that doctrine. That, in turn, would have left the interstate privi-
leges and immunities clause; however, the protection of that clause could
have been easily withdrawn as well. The Court could have held that the
right to contract for state employment and to engage in other direct
transactions with the state is a nonfundamental right that is not pro-
tected by the interstate privileges and immunities clause. The interstate
privileges and immunities clause protects only those rights that are fun-
' Hughes, 426 U.S. at 810.
, 3 424 U.S. 645 (1976).
"' Id. at 646.
'e' Id. at 647
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damental to the national unity that ensues when each state is deprived of
the power to treat fellow Americans as though they were aliens.86 There-
fore, nonfundamental status for the right to engage in direct transactions
with the state is an arguable possibility. The right to hunt elk from a
state's elk herds, for example, is not fundamental in this sense.'67
Admittedly, this proposition does not appear to be too persuasive. Col-
lectively, state and local government might be the nation's largest em-
ployer. Regardless of whether this proposition is persuasive, a ruling that
the right to make contracts with the state is not a fundamental right that
is protected by the interstate privileges and immunities clause remains a
sound possibility; Camden leaves this possibility open,'168 deliberately it
would seem, and without explanation.
The Court has yet to explain its reasons for stripping nonresidents of
all protection when they want to make employment contracts with the
state. A state, of course, can find most of its work force within its borders
and the Constitution should not compel a state to conduct an interstate
search when it hires employees. However, practical considerations which
permit a state to draw its work force primarily from its own residents do
not suggest that a state may preclude nonresidents from state jobs.
B. Rational Decision-making Instead of the State-Market-Participant
Doctrine
Just as a local government can easily justify having a predominantly
resident work force, the results in recent state- market-participant cases
could have been reached on rational grounds, without the use of a doc-
trine that arbitrarily strips nonresidents of the protection of the com-
merce clause. Thus, the right of a state to grant a subsidy or similar assis-
tance to attract or retain industry would justify the results in several of
these cases. A state, for example, can send its printing work exclusively to
firms located with in the state; 6 9 local firms generate benefits for the
state that are not reflected in their prices. Out-of-state firms can attempt
to make their prices more attractive if that seems to be the better course
to take.
Similarly, Reeves v. Stake1 70 held that a state can make preferential
sales from the state's cement plant to its residents in times of shortage,
although the extensive business of nonresidents customers contributed to
the plant's success.'' In Reeves, the state asserted that it went into the
"' Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 380-81.
,6, Id. at 388.
- U.S. at , 104 S. Ct. at 1027-28.
1 Cf. American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719 (M.D. Fla.), aff'd mer., 409
U.S. 904 (1972).
M 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
17 Id. at 430-32.
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cement business because private enterprise was not providing enough ce-
ment for its citizens. 72 It is arguable, then, that if the commerce clause
required the state to behave as an ordinary entrepreneur, it would perpet-
uate the defects of the private market when the state's reason for enter-
ing the market in the first place was to alleviate these defects. Ordinarily,
a state should have authority to subsidize or assist cement purchases for
its citizens free of the frustration that would ensue from having to share
the benefits of its assistance program with nonresidents.
On the other hand, it is more difficult to explain the state's actions in
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.'73 as an appropriate discriminatory
use of its subsidy power against nonresidents. Alexandria Scrap, the first
of the new state-market-participant cases,174 held that the commerce
clause does not prevent a state from eliminating nonresident scrap
processors from the state's bounty payment program to remove unsightly
junked automobiles from areas where they accumulate."' A nonresident
scrap processor in Virginia had challenged his exclusion from Maryland's
bounty payment program."" He claimed that the program had the effect
of barring his acquisition of junked cars that, if not for the program, he
would have been able to purchase. He then claimed that the state should
let him receive the bounties necessary to buy these cars.'77 The court up-
held his exclusion from the program.
Undoubtedly, Maryland could have successfully cleaned up its environ-
ment. The case appears to be a stand-off; the state must either unwill-
ingly part with bounty payments or the nonresident must give up a por-
tion of his interstate business. Still, the nonresident's business and that
of other scrap processors leave the state with costly clean-up work. With
neither party at fault, it appears, nevertheless, that the nonresident's es-
sential claim is a weak one: the commerce clause gives him a right to be
part of the solution because he is part of the problem.'78 The cement case,
Reeves v. Stake, suggests that when private enterprise requires the state
to make nonregulatory expenditures, the state can allocate them exclu-
sively to its own residents.17 9
A state surely can subsidize purchases for private scrap removal firms
in the state even if the only purpose of the subsidy is to aid local firms.
Further, it would seem that the state should not have to share this sub-
sidy with competing scrap removal firms in other states. Rather, other
' Id. at 430.
173 426 U.S. 794.
"I See South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 2237, 2243
(1984).
17' 426 U.S. at 809.
Id. at 797, 803 n.13.
Id. at 824-26 n.6 (Brennan,-J., dissenting).
178 447 U.S. 429.
M7' See supra text accompanying notes 174-82.
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states could choose whether to subsidize their local firms. This type of
competition between the states is fair and has taken place in one form or
another for many years.
Alexandria Scrap could be decided rationally either way without use of
the state-market-participant doctrine, an enclave of constitutional law
that permits arbitrary state discrimination against nonresidents. The
same is also true of local hire laws; in fact, since local hire laws for the
employees of public contractors must now satisfy the demands of the in-
terstate privileges and immunities clause,18 ° there is no apparent reason
why its companion, the commerce clause, should not also receive the same
treatment.
The state-market-participant doctrine, however, may be in trouble.
South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 18 ' which was de-
cided three months after Camden, suggests that the doctrine may col-
lapse from the weight of its own contradictions. If this does happen, the
doctrine could be curtailed to the point where its arbitrary impact would
only be felt by a party who contracts with the state. It could also be re-
placed completely by a set of rules prohibiting unfair competition be-
tween the states when a state discriminates against nonresidents in the
management of state property. Prohibiting this type of discrimination
when other states would be incapable of making a competitive response
could be the foundation of these rules.
C. South-Central Timber
South-Central Timber is the only recent case concerning the state-pro-
prietorship or market-participant doctrine remaining to be considered. 2
The majority of the export customers for Alaska's timber are located in
Japan'83 and the state required private logging companies which bought
timber owned by the state to partially process it in Alaska before export-
ing it.184 This requirement was challenged on the ground that it violated
the commerce clause. 8 ' The requirement fragmented the court to such an
extent that further proceedings became necessary to determine its valid-
ity. Thus, the validity of the local timber processing requirement for ex-
port sales remains uncertain.
A plurality opinion subscribed by Justices White, Brennan, Blackmun,
and Stevens attempted to apply the state-proprietorship or market-par-
ticipant doctrine in a way that would invalidate the local timber process-
- U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1023.
- U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 2237 (1984).
182 Id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2243-44.
Id. at - 104 S. Ct. at 2239 n.4.
1 Id. at , 104 S. Ct. at 2239.
I Yd.
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ing requirement."' Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor, however, were of
the opinion that the market-participant doctrine validated the require-
ment. 8 7 Justice Powell and Chief Justice Burger, on the other hand,
thought that further proceedings were necessary to determine whether
the local timber processing requirement was consistent with the market-
participant doctrine. '88 They and the four plurality justices voted to re-
verse the judgement of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals which had
upheld the requirement on other grounds.'89 Justice Marshall did not
participate in the decision. 190
Both South-Central Timber and Camden have the same structure; the
state in both cases made a contract with a private party. Each contract
contained a provision tying local use of its subject matter to the disposi-
tion of state property. Further, in each case the private party promised to
impose the tie when he contracted with others pursuant to the state con-
tract. The private parties to the state contracts were logging companies in
South-Central Timber and public contractors in Camden. The tie in
South-Central Timber was designed to increase sawmilling in the state;
the purpose of the tie in Camden, a local-hire provision, was to direct a
share the wages of construction employees to local retail businesses and
to local government in the form of property taxes.
The South-Central Timber plurality could not have overlooked these
similarities. Perhaps that is why they specifically emphasized that in a
public contractor case work is being performed for the state and thus the
state retains "a continuing proprietary interest in the subject of the con-
tract."'191 This statement purports to distinguish South-Central Timber
from Camden with respect to application of the state-market-participant
doctrine.
Although the plurality opposed tying local sawmilling to the state's ex-
port timber sales to private loggers, they appeared to assume that Alaska
could provide for the local sawmilling of its timber in other ways, includ-
ing "by selling only to Alaska processors, by vertical integration, or by
direct subsidy."'" 2 Interestingly, the plurality found a close factual resem-
blance between Alaska's sawmilling tie and the comparatively old prece-
dent of Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel.'93 The four justices were
especially impressed with that part of Foster-Fountain that stops a
state's power to tie a local use requirement to a transfer of its property at
188 Id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2245-47.
117 Id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2248-49.
,' Id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2248.
"' Id. at 104 S. Ct. at 2240.
Id. at , 104 S. Ct. at 2247.
181 Id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2246.
192 Id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2246.
193 278 U.S. 1 (1928).
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the point where the transfer is to private enterprise for export."9 4
Rationally, this analogy should also preclude Alaska from imposing the
sawmilling tie by vertical integration, if vertical integration means state
ownership of the sawmills and perhaps the logging business as well as the
standing timber. This would follow because the effect of a state's release
of its resources for export upon the validity of a tie for their local process-
ing should be the same regardless of whether there is vertical integration
of the required economic processes and their property components.
Nevertheless, drawing the validation line for the tie at vertical integra-
tion has some justification. The line allows the tie only when a party to a
state timber sale contract has to accept it.1" 5 Prohibiting the tie here
would obviously repudiate the entire state-market-participant doctrine
because parties to a state contract would not have to observe an arbitrary
tie. The same rule would also apply to nonparties to a state contract. No
person would be bound by an arbitrary tie and the state-market- partici-
pation doctrine would no longer exist. With the market-participant doc-
trine no longer applicable, the commerce clause seemingly would apply to
all contracts made by the state. The interstate privileges and immunities
clause should follow suit. As a result, McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil
Service Commission""6 would have to be overruled or at least explained
with the change in operation of these two clauses.
Stipulating for local sawmilling by vertical integration is a particular
form of a local tie. It may be substantially the same, however, as making
a provision for local sawmilling by selling timber only to local sawmills. It
is not completely clear, moreover, what the plurality South-Central Tim-
ber meant when they spoke of this. One possibility is that the state could
sell export timber only to private local sawmills who would process it.
This approach is no different in form or substance than selling export
timber to private loggers subject to a tie for local sawmilling. Further, the
four plurality justices disapproved of such a tie. Therefore, it is unlikely
that they would approve substantially the same tie simply because it was
incident to timber sales to private sawmills rather than to private logging
companies.
Another possibility is quite different, however; the state could with-
draw its timber from the world and national markets and confine its use
to consumption in the state.19 This withdrawal of the state's timber, ob-
viously, could not be construed as unfair competition. The only timber
that the withdrawing state could realistically hope to sawmill for the
world is its own timber; withdrawal of its own timber, therefore would
also constitute withdrawal from competition for the world's sawmilling
- U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2245 n.9.
1' Id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2246.
196 424 U.S, 645 (1976).
17 Cf. - U.S. at , 104 S. Ct. at 2245 n.9.
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business.
Further, the South-Central Timber plurality approved the use of a par-
ticular kind of subsidy to get a local sawmilling tie. The approved subsidy
was one whereby "the purchaser would retain the option of taking advan-
tage of the subsidy by processing timber in the state or foregoing the ben-
efits of the subsidy and exporting unprocessed timber."' 9 8 This kind of
subsidy would increase a state's sawmilling industry only when the state
paid a substantial price for it, a price that other states could match by
subsidizing their sawmilling industries if that were worth their while.
Thus, other states could compete with the subsidizing state measure for
measure and the market would influence the outcome. Finally, any bene-
fit to the subsidizing state would not be cost free.
These conditions are absent, however, when a state with market power
over a resource such as timber uses this power to prescribe a tie of local
use incident to sale.'99 The state imposing the tie may get local work that
would be done elsewhere but for the tie because the state selling timber
with a tie has the cost-free clout of market power.'00 In other words, tim-
ber buyers will pay the market price plus the tie rather than seek timber
elsewhere at the risk of a higher price or increased costs.' Other states,
however, lack the economic clout of the timber-selling state because they
lack timber in the quantity that would provide it. Therefore, they cannot
compete measure-for-measure with the state that sells timber with a tie.
The court should hold, consequently, that state sale of a resource in the
world or national market, but with a tie for local use, impermissibly dis-
criminates against competing users in other states. The commerce clause
should strike down this kind of tie.
D. Fair Competition Between States for Local Industry
-Inducements Versus Unfair Contractual Ties
A contractual stipulation tying state timber sales to local sawmilling is
the same as one tying performance of local construction work to local la-
bor. This would be especially true in a metropolitan area populated by a
work force that may commute daily throughout the region to and from
work. Under these circumstances, a state that would tie working in the
state to living there would simply be using its market power over jobs to
increase its population and tax base to the detriment of a neighboring
state. States, of course, can compete fairly with each other for industry
without exercising the power to tie jobs to residence within their boun-
dries. Many inducements to attract business are available to each of the
states. These include, for example, subsidies, tax breaks, special services
' Id. at -' 104 S. Ct. at 2244.
Id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2245-46.
200 Id.
2", Id.
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and assistance, and low wage and tax scales, to mention only some that
are familiar. All states can use these incentives. On the other hand, a
state that has a deficit of jobs, like a state that has a timber shortage may
remain unnecessarily short on population as well if other states have the
power to tie living in a state to working there.
A state, for example, that has built a large industrial sector, after hav-
ing won a fair contest for industry and jobs, should not be allowed to use
this economic power as leverage to swell its victory. Ordinarily, the com-
merce clause should prohibit this type of tying power. The clause has this
effect relative to state control of private enterprise. °2 The nature of the
tie remains the same, of course, when imposed by an enterprise owned or
controlled by the state. This statement suggests only a general rule, how-
ever. Core cities in the nation's metropolitan areas need special assistance
in order to improve their tax base. A city arguably should be allowed to
require a person who works at a job that the city has bought and paid for
to live in the city, and to move if he or she lives elsewhere.
VIII. LOCAL HIRE-A CHANGE-OF-RESIDENCE RULE
The ability of a city to require its employees and others who, in effect,
are on the city's payroll to live in the city should be upheld. This ap-
proval-of-residence rule would permit modest amelioration of urban met-
ropolitan problems by providing some aid to beleaguered central cities by
requiring a more-or-less equal sacrifice from all suburban dwellers who
earn a living from the city, including those in neighboring states. More-
over, ordinary easy compliance with the rule would usually provide equal
access to the jobs subject to it.
Still, a change-of-residence rule would encounter serious obstacles. The
rule would discriminate against nonresidents of the state that adopted it.
They would be required to relocate while residents of the city that en-
acted the rule would not. Further, since the power to adopt such a rule
could not appropriately ebb and flow with an index of leading economic
indicators, a city must be allowed to adopt the rule regardless of whether
there is a present need for it. Thus, a change-of-residence rule related to
employment is susceptible to the charge of inherent overbreadth, namely
of unnecessarily discriminating against nonresidents of the regulating
state when the discrimination would not help an imperiled central city.
Further, the rule also might be seen as colliding with precedents that os-
tensibly restrict the power of a state to ameliorate its own economic hard-
ship by laws that transfer the hardship to other states. 20 3
The overbreadth objection appears more theoretical than real. Ex-
panding cities usually experience growing pains and undoubtedly should
2'0 See supra text accompanying notes 89-122.
'03 - U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2245-46.
1984-85]
25Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1984
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
not want to add to them with a requirement that would increase the city's
rate of growth. Further, a stable city will need more than a city-residence
rule if its goal is to provide an impetus for expansion. The practical rea-
sons for having a change-of-residence rule suggest that its exercise would
essentially be limited to cases of need where a large core city is facing or
experiencing deterioration of its tax base.
A change-of-residence rule has less of an impact than a rule that re-
quires residence within the city before the hiring occurs. Although moving
one's home unnecessarily is not a minimal inconvenience, a city that
wanted to limit city jobs to its existing residents would get little help
from a change-of-residence rule. A nonresident of the state who lived
within commuting distance could move when a move would be worth-
while. It is true, of course, that in a metropolitan area that is spread
across state lines, a change-of-residence rule for city-related employment
would impose some hardship upon suburbs in another state that they
otherwise would not experience. At the same time, it would benefit a core
city in the regulating state. Thus, the out-of-state loss will result in gain
for the regulating state.
This impact of the change-of-residence rule should not invalidate it,
however. The situation is not like that in Baldwin0" where New York was
accused of attempting to save its dairy industry by mandating a local
trade preference that might have caused the loss of the dairy industry in
a neighboring state. A change-of-residence rule for city-related employ-
ment cannot be faulted as an attempt by one state to transfer to another
state as much of its economic misery as possible. Instead, the rule would
impose a moderate and proportionate sacrifice upon all suburbs. This sit-
uation is more like one involving a legislated price increase for a state's
products.' 0 All consumers, wherever located, ultimately pay for the in-
crease. The benefit to special producer interests in the regulating state
does not cause the law to fail. The same should be true of a change-of-
residence rule for city-related employment, although it too brings special
benefits to the tax base of a core city.
The protection, however, that ordinarily would be provided by a
change-of-residence rule to persons who would observe it would probably
not help the suburban construction workers in Camden. Most of them
were white2 °. and moving to Camden might not save their jobs; Camden's
affirmative action plan, which went unchallenged in the Supreme
204 294 U.S. 511 (1935). See supra text accompanying notes 89-94.
20" The commerce clause allowed California to require its raisin producers to sell raisins
through a pool that had a monopoly of almost all domestic raisins as well as one-half of the
world's supply. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 345-48, 360 (1943). Similarly, the clause does
not invalidate a state minimum price control law for all milk sales by producers, Milk Con-
trol Bd. v. Eisenberg Farm Prod., 306 U.S. 246 (1939).
20 See supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
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Court,20 7 probably would disqualify many of them for city construction
work. Still, this disqualification should have been met head on by the
Court, it is not an adequate reason for invalidating a change-of-residence
rule that discriminates on the ground of state citizenship rather than
race.
Moreover, it is possible to uphold a change-of-residence rule under the
interstate privileges and immunities clause, regardless of whether the
state-market-participant doctrine continues to withhold the protection of
the commerce clause from nonresidents who confront local hire laws.20 '
To a large extent, both clauses mandate the same principles.2 9 This par-
allel protection and its contraction by the state-market-participant doc-
trine renders the doctrine very puzzling, regardless of what ultimately
happens to it.
IX. THE STATE-MARKET-PARTICIPANT DOCTRINE AND THE CONTRACTION
OF CONGRESS' COMMERCE POWER
Camden seems to explain the state-market-participant doctrine with
the observation that the restrictions imposed by the commerce clause
upon state power apply only to state regulation.2 " However, in Foster-
Fountain Packing Company v. Haydel,2 1 1 which involved what were es-
sentially state contractual dispositions of wild game owned by the state,
the Court seemed unaware of the possibility that state enterprise as a
whole, including contract and property transactions, was arbitrarily ex-
cepted from the restrictions of the commerce clause.
212
The case for an arbitrary exception seems dubious in any event. The
rationale for the clause's restrictions upon state power does not readily
support one. The suggested rationale is that certain burdens upon activ-
ity within the scope of the commerce clause are too potentially destruc-
tive of common national interests to be imposed without with the ap-
proval of Congress. 213 Undoubtedly, these burdens are cast primarily in
the form of state regulation, including taxation. "" However, the emphasis
of the clause's protective power seems to be upon the burdens themselves
rather than the form in which they appear. Camden and the other state-
market-participant cases simply do not explain why the burdens that
they allow do not have to satisfy the protective rules of the commerce
clause.
o See supra text accompanying notes 29-40.
2o8 See supra text accompanying notes 1-14.
:09 See supra text accompanying notes 72-76.
"o See supra text accompanying notes 67-78.
2-1 278 U.S. 1 (1928).
212 See supra text accompanying notes 140-151.
21" J. NOWAK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 267-68 (1983). See L. TRIBE, supra note 52, at 402-03.
114 Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489, 492-94 (1887).
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The Supreme Court, however, could use the state -market-participant
doctrine to withdraw most labor relations in the private sector from the
regulatory power of Congress. The course of adjudication to accomplish
this objective would involve a two-step process. First, most state employ-
ment relations would be withdrawn from Congress' commerce power. Sec-
ond, this enclave of immunity would be used as a springboard to get simi-
lar results in the private sector. The state-market- participant doctrine
lends itself to both steps. The doctrine appears to stand for the proposi-
tion that activity subject to it does not touch the concerns of the com-
merce clause." '1 Taken literally, this would mean that activity within the
doctrine would fall beyond the reach of Congress' affirmative power to
regulate interstate commerce, as well as outside the negative restraints of
the commerce clause.
2 1 6
If this literal interpretation is valid, the hiring of the employees of pub-
lic contractors who do construction work for the state falls within the
state-market-participant doctrine." A state, of course, also participates
in the marketplace when it hires its own employees. State employment
relations, consequently, must also fall within the state-market-participant
doctrine. It is arguable, Lherefore, that state employment relationships, as
well as the employment of employees of public contractors, are ordinarily
beyond the reach of Congress' commerce power.
State employees, moreover, unlike the employees of public contractors,
are also likely to be beyond the protection of the interstate privileges and
immunities clause. The Supreme Court will probably hold, when the oc-
casion for a ruling arises, that state employment is not a fundamental
right or privilege essential to national unity and, therefore, is not pro-
tected by the interstate privileges and immunities clause."'
In any event, the state-market-participant doctrine can cut a fairly
large swath; it is capable of putting an indefinite number of state prop-
erty and contractual transactions beyond the reach of Congress' com-
merce power. These transactions could constitute an enclave of immunity
that would provide a network of support for the core proposition that
most state employment relationships are beyond the reach of Congress'
regulatory power and lack even the protection of the interstate privileges
and immunities clause.
Further, in invalidating application of the minimum wage and maxi-
mum hours provisions of the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act to state
employees, National League of Cities v. Usery, 19 which overruled Mary-
land v. Witz, already purports to place the employment relations of state
25 Hughes, 426 U.S. at 805, 823 n.4.
216 Id.
Camden, __ U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1025.
218 See supra text accompanying notes 167-77.
2 " 426 U.S. 833 (1976). With this case the Court overruled Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S.
183 (1968). See 426 U.S. at 855.
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employees who perform traditional essential sovereign governmental
functions largely beyond the reach of Congress' commerce power.2 The
state-market-participant doctrine could increase this enclave to include
state employees who perform other functions. Moreover, if this develop-
ment were ever to occur and become firmly secure, someone would even-
tually question the contradiction of congressional power over employment
relations in the private sector.
National League of Cities provides a basis for differentiating between
private sector employees whose employment would lie beyond Congress'
regulatory power and those whose employment relations Congress could
continue to regulate. National League of Cities did not completely insu-
late state employees who perform governmental functions from Congress'
commerce power. Instead, the Court approved Fry v. United States,2 21 a
congressional exercise of the commerce power that froze a generous pay
increase for Ohio's state employees.2 2 The wage freeze for state employ-
ees was part of a general wage freeze enacted to prevent the disastrous
consequences of runaway inflation."' The Court observed that these con-
sequences are obvious, pervasive and potentially devastating to the nation
and all of its parties.2 4 However, Congress' lack of power to increase a
minimum wage or to mandate one in National League of Cities was not
comparable as it did not create a risk of comparable magnitude. 225
A magnitude test for a permissible exercise of Congress' commerce
power is reminiscent of the once-used direct-indirect effects test. 2 ' Under
this test, most effects of the nation's producing activities upon interstate
commerce were indirect, and therefore, the activities that caused them
were beyond the reach of Congress.2 27 Fry might someday permit rein-
"' 426 U.S. at 845, 851-52.
221 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
222 Id. at 544-45.
... Id. at 548.
211 426 U.S. 853.
22. Id.
221 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 304-05 (1936); Schecter v. United States, 295
U.S. 495, 544, 546 (1935).
227 Id. See also L. TRIBE, supra note 52, at 234-35. Admittedly, the direct-indirect effects
test put labor relations in producing activities largely beyond the reach of Congress' com-
merce power regardless of the magnitude of their impact upon interstate commerce; Carter,
298 U.S. at 308. It would be possible to formulate or manipulate a magnitude test that
would classify industrial labor relations as isolated multitudinous fragments that are com-
pletely local in nature and, therefore, beyond the reach of Congress' commerce power. Thus,
the Court once said: "The relations of employer and employee is a local relation. At common
law, it is one of the domestic relations .... " Id. Federal antitrust law validly reached in-
dustrial labor union activity in intrastate commerce when it was aimed at interstate com-
merce although, at the time, most labor relations were beyond the reach of Congress' com-
merce power, especially when the power was exercised to protect labor. Compare the
discussion approving application of federal antitrust law to labor unions in Carter, 298 U.S.
at 304-05, and Schecter, 295 U.S. at 547, with the decisions in these two cases holding that
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statement of a version of this test with its consequences. That would en-
sue from the inability of Congress to regulate wages, hours and working
conditions in the mines, mills, factories and farms in the nation. Due to a
disincentive by states to increase wage scales and other costs that make
industry within their territory noncompetitive in the interstate market,
loss of congressional control over industrial labor relations probably
would mean loss of any effective governmental power over these relations
and restoration of a constitutional regime of laissez-faire.22s
It is true, of course, that there are assurances throughout the National
League of Cities opinion that these developments will not come to
pass.229 These assurances, however, failed to reassure the four Justices
who dissented from the Court's judgment 230 and nothing would prevent
the court from later concluding that the assumptions upon which these
assurances rest are in reality ill-founded. Nor is it significant that, after
National League of Cities, a unanimous Court held that Congress can
apply the Railway Labor Act'"5 to the employees of a state railroad. 32
The commerce clause allowed Congress to regulate the intrastate aspects
of railroading when it was also powerless to touch employment relations
in the nation's production activities.2"'
Moreover, it is also true that those members of the Court who might
want to free industrial labor relations from Congress' commerce power
have not yet secured a firm position for this purpose within the subject of
state employment relations. Thus, the Court in EEOC v. Wyoming2 3 re-
cently held that the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act, an
exercise of Congress' commerce power,23 5 validly forbids a state from forc-
ing state game wardens to retire when they become fifty-five years old.
The decision, however, was fought hard and close 3 6 and could easily be
overturned with a change in the Court's membership.
This foregoing outline of possible developments that could ensue from
Congress could not protect coal miners and food processing employees from the economic
power of their employers. Similarly, compare the holding in National League of Cities
which also denied Congress power to protect the employees of state and local government
from the bargaining power of their employers with Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542
(1975), which allowed Congress to deny a pay increase to these employees although their
employers wanted them to have it. See 426 U.S. at 852-53. See also Id. at 872 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
228 Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 567-68 (1937)(oral argument of Assistant
General Jackson). Cf. Carter, 298 U.S. at 260-62 (oral argument of Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Dickinson).
229 426 U.S. at 840-42, 844-45.
230 Id. at 867-68, 875, 880.
231 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1983).
212 United Trans. Union v. Long Island RR, 455 U.S. 678 (1982).
211 See the Court's discussion in Schecter, 295 U.S. at 544.
' 460 U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983).
,35 Id. at -' 103 S. Ct. at 1064.
211 Id. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 1068 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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the state-market-participant doctrine is speculative, to be sure, but rests
upon more than mere speculation. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.2 37
the initial recent state-marketparticipant case that removed discrimina-
tory state transactions from the negative restraints of the commerce
clause, ' sits next to National League of Cities in the Supreme Court
reports.' a The latter case, of course, definitely removes some of the mar-
ket transactions of a state with its own employees from Congress' com-
merce power.240 Further, the dissenting opinion in Alexandria Scrap
asked (in a footnote) whether the state market participant doctrine with-
drew state bounty transactions for processing junked cars from Congress'
power to regulate commerce as well as from the negative restraints of the
commerce clause.24" ' The answer of the majority judges (also given in a
footnote) was not responsive to the question.242
Under all of the circumstances, speculation about the significance of
the state -market-participant doctrine is appropriate and unavoidable.
The doctrine has caused a partial estrangement of two clauses in the con-
stitution that have travelled hand-in-hand 42 from their common origin.244
The state-market-participant doctrine is amenable to uses that are far
more precedent-shattering than National League of Cities. Perhaps some
day the Supreme Court will explain what the state-market-participant
doctrine is really all about, especially considering its far reaching
implications.
2.7 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
138 Id. at 810.
... Id. at 832; National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 833.
See supra text accompanying notes 225-29.
',' 426 U.S. at 822 n.4 (Brown, J., dissenting).
Id. at 810 n.19.
... See supra text accompanying notes 89-122, 125-161.
2' Hicklin, 437 U.S. at 531-32 n.16; Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 379-80.
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